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ABSTRACT
This paperinvestigatesthe motivationsfor local right-to-farmprotection ordinancesby es-
timatingalogit model relatingtheadoptionof theseordinancesto variouspolitical,economic
and demographic factors previously found to affect the likelihood of passage of farmland
preservationpolicies. Resultssuggest thatthe probability of adoptingright-to-farmpolicies
increaseswith the size andpolitical clout of thefarm public andwith incentivesto promote
right-to-farm.Adoption is not enhancedby environmentalconcerns, nor by factors known
to encourage adoption of farmlandpreservationpolicies. These findingsraise serious con-
cerns aboutthe long-nm viability of protectionsafforded agriculturein urbanizingareas.
Key Words: nuisance litigation, open space, political economy, restrictive ordinances,
right-to-farm.
All fifty states in the US have advanced Right-
to-Farm (RTF) laws in recent years (Hamilton
and Andrews, 1993). These laws, many of
which were passed after 1980, surfaced in re-
sponse to concerns about the diminishing
farmland base and the threats to agriculture by
inappropriate private and public nuisance ac-
tions which adversely affect the viability of
farms. RTF laws attempt to diminish the threat
to normal farming practices posed by nuisance
litigation and prohibitive state and local gov-
ernment regulation. Many perceive RTF laws
as an important component of any farmland
retention policy. As opposed to typical farm-
land preservation policies which aim to pre-
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serve farmland, RTF laws attempt to preserve
agricultural practices and enhance farm via-
bility (Lisansky, 1986; Lapping and Leutwiler,
1987; and Lapping, Penfold and McPherson,
1983).
The promulgation of local (municipal or
county) RTF laws in recent years may suggest
that state laws are not altogether effective. For
instance, weaknesses in the New Jersey RTF
Act (NJRTFA) have been exposed by Adelaja
et al (1996) and by several recent court deci-
sions. Local RTF laws represent voluntary
support for farming practices by a community
and, in many cases, represent more clearly de-
lineated and stronger protections for farming
practices than state laws. Local laws typically
define the extent of protection farmers actually
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The growing reliance on these protection
mechanisms has been the result of the rapid
suburbanization of many areas that were tra-
ditionally predominantly farming in charac-
ter. According to Adelaja, Schilling and Men-
zo (1997), the typical farm family (two adults
and two children) controlling 300 acres could
be replaced by over a thousand new non-farm
residents. Such a transformation rapidly
erodes the political clout of farmers such that
a municipality that was dominated by farm
interests can change quickly to one dominat-
ed by non-farm interests and political agenda.
The new residents are typically not familiar
with or tolerant of normal farming practices.
Hence, agricultural land-use conflicts may re-
sult (Centner and Bergstrom, 1988). Residen-
tial encroachment eliminates the buffer pro-
vided by open space that mitigates the
“potentially harmful but inescapable side ef-
fects of farm technology” (Thompson, 1982).
These side effects—such as odor, noise,
smoke, dust, and chemical spray drift—in-
crease the possibilityy that farmers will be held
liable for creating nuisances and lead to more
government regulation. Laws restricting
noise, odor, manure spreading, plowing, open
burning, farm-stands, etc. that are typical to
agriculture are common in suburbanizing ar-
eas.
Private and public nuisance litigation
along with government regulation tend to
raise agricultural production costs, and in ex-
treme cases can prohibit certain agricultural
practices (Thompson, 1982). While agricul-
ture generates positive externalities such as
open space, rural scenery, air and water re-
charge, wildlife habitat, rural lifestyles, and a
host of other benefits (Gardner, 1977), it also
generates negative externalities such as odor,
dust and noise. The extent of legal protection
that would be put in place for agriculture
therefore depends on public demand for open
space and the other benefits of farming, the
ties have adoptedlocal RTF ordinancesthatestablish
a disputemechanismto preventconflictsfrom escalat-
ing into lawsuits(Hamilton,1992a). In New Jersey,
however, some municipallaws provide greaternui-
sanceprotectionthanthestateAct.
strength of the farm and non-farm commu-
nities in terms of political clout, the relative
demerits of farming to the non-farm public,
the degree to which the farm and the non-
farm public are pleased with the extent of
protection offered farming, the political cli-
mate, and other factors.
Hypotheses have been advanced about
the political-economic process that leads to
the passage of farmland preservation poli-
cies. However, little explanation has been
put forth regarding the enactment of RTF
laws. Also, while many studies have de-
scribed RTF laws, none has focused on em-
pirical analysis of the rationale for such
laws. The few studies on RTF have focused
on state level laws. No study has investigat-
ed local RTF laws (at the county or munic-
ipal level).
A review of the literature reveals that farm-
land preservation strategies emanate from the
desires of the non-farm public to control
growth by preserving open space, acquire en-
vironmental amenities, and ensure environ-
mental quality, and the desire of the farm com-
munity to preserve the agricultural industry
(Logan, 1976; Gardner, 1977; Frieden, 1979;
Baldassare, 1981; Fischel, 1982; Protash and
Baldassare, 1983; Fttruseth, 1985a and 1985b;
Kline and Wilchens, 1994). Whether or not
this applies to RTF laws needs to be investi-
gated in order to gain understanding about the
viability of these laws and the sustainability of
agriculture in the long run. This is particularly
so in urbanizing areas where farmland loss
threatens the future of farming, where farmers’
political clout is declining, and where there is
concern about the ability of the political pro-
cess to produce RTF laws at the state and local
levels.
The objective of this paper is to investi-
gate the rationale for the legal protections af-
forded farmers at the local level and the ap-
plicability to RTF of various hypotheses
about farmland preservation advanced by
Gardner (1977). Hypotheses are developed
relating the strength of agricultural protection
to variables related to motivations for protec-
tion, the political clout of the farm and non-
farm public, and various socio-economic andAdelaja and Friedman: Political Economy Right-to-Farm 567
political factors. To test these hypotheses,
data on the existence and nature of RTF or-
dinances are obtained from all New Jersey
municipalities. 2 These are classified into cat-
egories of weak and strong protections. The
information is supplemented by data on var-
iables representing the hypothesized deter-
minants of the likelihood of existence of an
RTF law. The data are used in estimating em-
pirical logit models for overall, strong, and
weak RTF laws.s
The rest of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 presents the conceptual frame-
work for this study. Factors hypothesized to
determine the extent of protection a commu-
nity wishes to grant agriculture and the prob-
ability y of adoption of a RTF statute are iden-
tified based on the literature on farmland
preservation and similar laws. Section 3 is the
empirical framework section and it introduces
the logit representation of the conceptual mod-
el which is used in this study. Section 4 de-
scribes the actual empirical model estimated
in this study, the data and the estimation pro-
cedure. Section 5 presents the empirical re-
sults. A summary and concluding remarks are
contained in Section 6.
Conceptual Framework
Standard farmland preservation strategies
(e.g. purchase of development rights [PDR]
and transfer of development rights [TDR]) re-
sult from the desire of the farm and non-farm
2New Jerseyis an excellentcase study.Farmland
preservationcontinuesto be the dominantissuecon-
cerning New Jersey agriculture. Urbanizationhas
claimedmuchof state’sfarmland.In 1950,NewJersey
had 1,770,000farmlandacres; this figuredroppedto
850,000acresby 1995(NewJerseyDepartment of Ag-
riculture,1996).In response,theNew JerseyLegisla-
ture passed three farmland preservationlaws: the
Farmland AssessmentAct-1to 10, 1983),theRTFAct
(N.J.S.A. $$4: lC-1 to 10)andtheAgriculturalReten-
tionandDevelopmentAct (N.J.S.A.$34:lC-11 to 48,
1983),TheFarmland Assessment Act hasprovidedbil-
lions of dollarsin taxsavingsto farmers,andfive ref-
erendahave raiseda total of $1.2 billion for the ac-
quisitionof farmlanddevelopmentrights.
~Threelogit analyseswill be presentedin theem-
pirical model section: one for all RTF laws andtwo
othersfor strongandweakRTF laws.
communities to preserve agriculture. This
they do by competing with developers via the
purchasing of development rights on farm-
land. By allocating a portion of municipal
revenues (or their incomes) toward preser-
vation, the public seeks to maximize its wel-
fare by securing the positive externalities as-
sociated with farmland (open space, air and
water recharge, rural scenery, lack of conges-
tion, environmental quality, rural lifestyles,
growth control, quality of life, etc.) which,
presumably, exceed the negative externalities
(smoke, odor, noise, dust, etc.). On the other
hand, restrictive ordinances on farming op-
eration are expected to reduce the negative
externalities from farming so that positive ex-
ternalities dominate, and a net gain to the
public results per acre of farmland in the
community. Regulation raises regulatory
compliance costs and may reduce farm prof-
itability (Adelaja et al., 1996; Thompson,
1982). Of course, the regulatory climate
could become so stringent that overegulation
stifles farm viability and diminishes agricul-
tural activity and aggregate farm acreage to
the point where the overall positive benefits
of farming are compromised. Optimal regu-
lation requires a delicate balancing of the
positive and negative externalities of agricul-
ture, and the profitability of the industry. It
must also consider the nature and current sta-
tus of farming and the environmental and re-
source amenities in the community.
Presumably, RTF protections and farmland
preservation spending represent a tradeoff to
the non-farm public. Both are similar in that
they are aimed at preserving agriculture or
open space and their net positive benefits. That
is, what the non-farm public gives up in the
case of RTF is not income or tax revenue, but
its property rights to regulate agriculture and
control some agricultural practices which gen-
erate negative externalities. The adoption of
RTF and of farmland preservation strategies
should be affected by a similar set of factors.
Empirical evidence exists in the literature
to guide the identification and selection of fac-
tors that determine the degree of regulation a
municipality wishes to impose on agriculture
(or RTF protection it wishes to grant). Such568 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
evidence also supports the prediction of the
directions of the effects of these factors. A re-
alistic starting point for analysis of RTF laws
is the exploration of the literature on the adop-
tion of laws in general, and similar laws such
as farmland preservation in particular (Gard-
ner, 1977). As indicated above, both policies
are alternative strategies for preserving/retain-
ing the public benefits of farmland.
In his ground-breaking article, Gardner
(1977) identified and classified the motives
behind farmland preservation laws. He pos-
tulated that governments adopt farmland
preservation policies for three reasons: (1)
agricultural resource preservation, (2) envi-
ronmental resource protection, and (3) mu-
nicipal growth management. All three moti-
vations are related to open space, the
environment, and quality of life. Gardner’s
work laid down the framework for future
studies on the subject. If his hypothesis is val-
id, the demand for RTF laws should increase
as more farmland is lost, as the stock of open
space in a municipality decreases, as a town-
ship becomes more congested, as quality of
life becomes more compromised, and as en-
vironmental quality falls.
A few studies have empirically tested
Gardner’s hypotheses while others have pro-
vided anecdotal evidence in support of it. For
example, in testing Gardner’s hypotheses,
Kline and Wichelns (1994) did not find em-
pirical support for the notion that demand for
preservation increases as farmland is lost. Nei-
ther did Furuseth (1985a), who actually found
the opposite: that the strongest farmland pro-
tection policies exist in communities that are
agriculturally oriented, with the greatest
amount of farmland acreage, with the largest
number of farms, with the most stable farm-
land base, with the greatest economic return
on farm products, and where farmers still have
significant political clout. Furuseth’s “farmer
initiated” or “farmer political clout” hypoth-
esis is an alternative hypothesis to Gardner’s
growth-control hypothesis. A positive rela-
tionship between farmland acreage and de-
mand for farmland retention would indicate
validity of Furuseth’s (1985a) farmer political
clout hypothesis. An inverse relationship
would support Gardner’s (1977) agricultural
resource preservation hypothesis.4
Kline and Wichelns (1994) did not restrict
their investigation only to the roles of farm-
land loss or farmers’ political clout. In fact,
they found that the nonagricultural objectives
(growth control and environmental protection)
had the greatest influence on support for pres-
ervation. With respect to growth control, they
found that areas with the greatest population
increase and the greatest increase in land and
house values were the more likely to support
preservation. Frieden (1979) and Fischel
(1982) also found support for the growth-con-
trol theory with anecdotal evidence from Cal-
ifornia and Vermont, respectively. Other stud-
ies also found that growth controls are not
intended to deter growth, but are directly at-
tributable to previous rapid population growth
and the desire of politicians to preserve their
careers (Rosenbaum, 1978; Protash and Bal-
dassare, 1983). The reasoning goes as follows.
A large influx of new residents can strain the
budgets of municipal governments as expen-
ditures on services and infrastructure climb.
Even if the expansion can be financed, the lo-
cal government may not be able to keep up
with the pace. Government officials may adopt
growth controls to ensure that municipal fi-
nances can meet current expenditures, since
the resulting financial stability can lengthen
their political careers. Under this scenario,
growth controls are adopted independent of
social conditions or any mobilization against
growth (Protash and Baldassare, 1983).
With respect to environmental quality,
4Additionalfactorsrelatedto thepoliticalclout of
farmersin New Jerseyare the statePurchaseof De-
velopment(PDR) programandtherole of theCounty
Agricultural Development Boards (CADBS). One
would expectmunicipalitieswithgreaterfarmerpolit-
ical clout to have alreadyenrolledland in the state’s
farmlandpreservation programsincestate,county,and
municipalitymatchingfunds are requiredfor preser-
vation.The StateAgriculturalDevelopmentCommit-
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Kline and Wichelns (1994) found that the
prevalence of resource-sensitive lands enhanc-
es the motivation for preservation. Further
support for the open space/environmental
quality hypothesis is found in the work of the
Urban Land Institute or ULI (1982) which
found that environmentalists promote farm-
land preservation as a mechanism to preserve
environmental assets, not to protect agricul-
tural production. The implication is that agri-
cultural production is not seen as an environ-
mental asset.
Logan (1976) relates the adoption of
growth-control policies to socioeconomic and
demographic factors. He posited that ‘high-
status’ communities undergoing rapid growth
rates have the necessary social and financial
resources to mobilize their citizens to press for
measures that attempt to preserve the existing
nature of their community. He defined ‘high-
status’ communities as those with higher av-
erage incomes, a high proportion of hom-
eowners, high educational attainment, low
levels of minority and poor residents, and
greater per-capita expenditures on public ser-
vices. In an expansion of Logan’s work, Pro-
tash and Baldassare (1983) concentrated on
two of Logan’s socioeconomic factors: the
proportion of homeowners and of white-collar
workers. A high proportion of homeowners
and of white-collar workers is hypothesized to
present a greater opportunity for a local com-
munity to combat growth because the greater
equity interest of homeowners in the local
community will motivate them to maintain or
improve the local status conditions by pro-
moting growth controls. Homeowners are also
more likely to belong to grass roots organi-
zations, expanding their communication chan-
nels and political influence.
Protash and Baldassare (1983) further ar-
gued that citizens with white-collar jobs are
more likely to possess the skills and resources
needed to mobilize the community against
well-funded growth lobbies, and are less likely
to feel politically powerless. On the other
hand, communities with low proportions of
homeowners and white-collar workers are ex-
pected to oppose growth controls since they
are more likely to view growth as a mecha-
nism to improve local employment and hous-
ing (Baldassare, 1981). Protash and Baldassare
(1983) suggest that citizens with the expertise
to understand complex legal issues and moti-
vate others to act may have a better chance of
getting their political agenda passed and pro-
pose that white-collar workers possess these
necessary technical skills. They also suggest
that rising property taxes, which result from
rising land and house values associated with
growing populations, affect the desire for pres-
ervation.
Political dynamics can also play a role in
legislative patterns. Dye (1966) presents a
general theoretical framework of legislation
adoption that explains the forces determining
the original adoption and later revisions of
laws. He identified four factors, two of which
represent the party system. The first, interparty
competition, is postulated to enhance the
adoption of new policies as the parties vie for
votes. The variable was measured by one mi-
nus the percentage of the majority party. The
second, the division of Democratic and Re-
publican control, relates party affiliation to
legislative outcomes. Republicans are believed
to favor deregulation and free enterprise while
Democrats favor government intervention.
This characterization may break down when
considering RTF laws. Republicans may in-
deed favor the legislation since the laws can
actually free agricultural enterprises from mu-
nicipal regulations and the hindrance of nui-
sance lawsuits, enhancing farm returns. Dye’s
third variable is voter participation. Non-vot-
ers are said to be typically lower-income, low-
er-status, poorly educated, and non-white
groups. Since conservatives receive their
greatest support from the high socioeconomic
groups, a small voter turnout is expected to
benefit their candidates (Dye, 1966). Dye’s last
political variable is the degree of inequality in
voter representation or malapportionment (de-
fined as “variation in the numbers of people
in legislative districts which receive the same
number of representatives”). Hence, state pol-
icy choices are affected by the policy differ-
ences of rural and urban constituencies (Dye
1966).
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governments is also said to influence adoption
patterns (Rosenbaum, 1976). Political leaders
and governments look to regional neighbors
for legislative innovation (the spillover effect)
because (1) neighboring districts probably
have similar problems, (2) there is a wide-
spread attitude that laws should be adapted to
those of nearby governments, and (3) officials
in neighboring towns often belong to the same
organizations and are therefore in close con-
tact with their neighboring counterparts (Shar-
kansky, 1970; Rosenbaum, 1976). On the oth-
er hand, it is possible that passage of a strong
piece of legislation by a neighboring princi-
pality provides a wake-up call to opponents of
the law, encouraging them to rise up and de-
feat similar legislation (the backlash effect).
The above explain the factors that could
affect a community’s desire to protect farmers
or adopt RTF statutes. For illustrative conve-
nience, denote the strength of the community’s
desire to protect farmers by ~. When ~ = 1,
absolute protection is desired and farmers are
given absolute rights to freely farm without
any fear of those burdensome regulations or
of litigation against those externalities that the
non-farm sector finds irksome. When ~ = O,
farmers get no protection from the govern-
ment. Theory and empirical evidence from the
literature therefore suggest that the determi-
nants of ~ include (1) the relative size of the
farm community, (2) the relative political
clout of the farm community, (3) the rate of
loss of farmland or open space, (4) the rate of
change of population, (5) population density,
(6) per-capita income, (7) home ownership, (8)
property values, (9) political structure of the
community, and (10) spatial proximity to
towns where similar laws exist. These vari-
ables relate to the environmental, or -n space,
quality of life and growth control motivations
for preservation,
Empirical Framework
In real life, political decision making is dis-
continuous and often occurs in a treadmi1.
fashion so that what one observes in reality IS
a dichotomous manifestation of ~. When ~
reaches a high enough threshold value, one
might observe the passage of a RTF law,
whereas low values of ~ might imply no such
law. Alternatively, a high value of ~ might
lead to the passage of a strong law while a
lower level of @ might imply a weaker law or
no law at all. Whether or not a polity adopts
protective mechanisms and the stringency of
the protections actually adopted depend on the
cumulative effects of the determinants of (3de-
scribed above.
Considering the dichotomous manifesta-
tion of ~ in real life, an appropriate approach
to modeling the adoption of RTF laws is via
a logit specification where the dependent var-
iable(s) assume discrete values representing
the presence or absence of a municipal RTF
law (strong or weak) and the independent
variables are as defined above.5 The decision
to enact RTF legislation is not a sequential
process. That is, a municipality decides to
adopt a RTF law. If so, the law may be weak
or strong, depending on the political environ-
ment. The municipal council does not first de-
cide to pass a RTF law and then separately
decide to choose between a weak and strong
version of the law. In the case of the former,
independent logit models for strong and weak
RTF laws would be adequate for empirical
analysis. If the latter were the case, a nested
or sequential logit model would be most ap-
propriate.
The following construction of the logit
model follows Liao (1994). The expected val-
ue of a choice variable Z is assumed to be
~Logit, linearprobability, andprobitmodelsareal-
ternativespecificationsof qualitativedependentvari-
able regressionmodels. They are prefemedto linear
models in discretechoice analysisbecausetheyelim-
inate heteroscedasticityand resultingefficiency loss
due to non-normal error.Results derived from logit and
probit models are identicat (Liao, 1994), except that
logit models may be more appropriate when distribu-
tions have heavier tails because the logistic probabdity
f, -tion, on which the logit model is based, has a fat-
:r-tailed distribution thanthecumulative normal func-
tion, on which the probit model is based (Pindyck and
Rubinfeld, 1981). In a case study of New Jerseywhere
there are stark contrasts between suburban and rural
areasand dataon agriculturalstatisticsatthemunicipal
level are highly fragmented, a logit model is probably
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dependent on a linear combination of k un-
known independent variables r. That is,
(1) E(Z) = z = ~~ b~r~,
where the b~s are parameters corresponding to
each r. A link variable, e, links ~~ b~r~to z,
creating the possibility of nonlinear specifica-
tions. The independent variables always pro-
duce e linearly, and e then predicts Z. The
relationship is given by:
(2) e = ~, b,r,.
The function that relates e to z must be spec-
ified. The model begins with the assumption
that an underlying response variable, z*, is de-
termined by a set of explanatory variables rk:
(3) z* = ~~ b~r~+ ~.
It is assumed that observations on z* are not
available. Rather, the data differentiate indi-
vidual observations between two categories,
low values of the response variable, z*, and
high values of z* (Pindyck and Rubinfeld,
1981). The error term, q has a mean of zero
and a cumulative distribution function (CDF)
defined as @(e).G
Observed data consist of the realization of
the underlying response variable: z = 1 if Z*
> 0 and z = O otherwise. From equation (3)
and the condition above, the following rela-
tionship of the probability of the event occur-
ring (z = 1) can be derived:
(4) Prob(z = 1)
— —
(




Prob e > –~~ b~r~
)= ’-m(-~bkrk)
The functional form of Q must be specified
6Equation (3) specifies the major difference be-
tween the linear probability model and logit and probit
models. In the linearmodel, the model directlyesti-
matesthe occurrence of an event, z. Logit and probit
models estimate the underlying response variable, z*.
based upon the assumption regarding the dis-
tribution of ~ in equation (3). When e follows
a logistic distribution, we have the logit model
and the link function becomes the logit e =
log[z/( 1 – z)]. The link translates into a logit
model that estimates the binary outcome of a
dependent variable. Expressed in logit form:
(5) log[{P(z = 1)}/{1 – p(z = l)}] = ~kb@’.
One can express equation (5) in terms of event
probability by replacing the general CDF with
the logistic distribution, L:
(6)
()
Prob(z = 1) = 1 – L –~~ bkr~
= L(~kb,rk)= ~Z’k/[l + ~Xrk].
Equation (5) is expressed in terms of the
probability of an event occurring (z = 1). The
alternative, the probability that an event will
not occur, is just 1 minus event probability:
()
(7) Prob(z = O) = L –~, b,rk
= [e-~’’]/[l + e-~”] = 1/[1 + e~’k].
The above specification can be applied to RTF
as follows. There are three cases. First, the de-
pendent variable is the probability of the adop-
tiort/existence of a municipal RTF law of any
variety. Second, the dependent variable is the
probability of a strong RTF law. Third, the
dependent variable is the probability of a weak
law. These models would estimate the influ-
ence that the hypothesized variables have on
the presence of a municipal RTF law. That is,
(8) log[{p(RTFYe,)}/{ 1
—p(RTFY.,)]] = Xk bkrk,
where P(RTFY.,) is the probability of a munic-
ipality having a RTF law. With this logit trans-
formation, the regression coefficients describe
the change in the logarithm of the odds of a
municipality having a RTF law to those that
do not, given a one-unit change in the value
of the independent variable (Liao, 1994).572 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics,









Actual and pending PDR acreage: 1992
Dummy variable for the three counties
(Cape May, Middlesex, and Morris) requir-
ing a local RTF law to qualify for county
funds
Environmental
The percentage of total farmland-assessed
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Growth Control
Percentage change in the population:
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The right to farm in New Jersey: a legal,
institutional and social analysis (Adelaj a
et al. )
Empirical Model, Data and Estimation
In light of the analysis above, the following
econometric model is specified for estimation:
(9) log[{P(RTFy.,) }/{ 1 – P(RTFY.,))1
= b, (CGAGLND) + b,(PERFARMS)
+ b~(APACRES) + b.(CADBREQ)
+ b,(WETWOOD) + B,(CHGPOP)
+ b,(INCOME) + b8(OWNOCC)
+ bg(WHTCOLAR) + b,O(CHGRSVAL)
+ b,, (DENSITY) + b12(MUNDEM)
+ bl~(SPATIAL) + l,
where ~ is an independent and normally dis-
tributed random error term with a mean of
zero and a constant variance. The independent
variables are described in Table 1. The mar-
ginal effect of an independent variable on the
probability of a municipality having RTF leg-Adelaja and Friedman: Political Economy Right-to-Farm 573
islation is calculated with the following equa-
tion:
(10) [dProb(RTF)]/[dr,] = [b,@ br]/[l + ~2br]2.
The marginal effect on the probability is
dependent upon the values of the independent
variables (r~). Their mean values can be used
to calculate the marginal effect. With contin-
uous independent variables, equation (10) pro-
vides a close approximation of the marginal
effect; however, the marginal effect of a dum-
my variable yields only rough estimates (Liao,
1994).
The state of New Jersey is used as a case
study. The most densely populated and sub-
urbanized state in the nation, New Jersey was
one of the first states to pass a RTF law and
its municipalities have been at the forefront of
legislative innovations to protect and preserve
the farmland base. A survey of New Jersey
municipal RTF laws was conducted as part of
this study. The details are provided in Adelaja
et al. (1996). All 328 New Jersey municipal-
ities with any farmland-assessed acreage were
contacted to determine if a local RTF law had
been adopted. The overwhelming majority of
municipalities were contacted by telephone. In
most circumstances, the municipal clerk could
determine whether the township had passed an
ordinance or has a section in the Codes that
provides RTF protections. In other cases, a
planning or zoning officer, construction offi-
cial, or the mayor provided the necessary in-
formation.7 Seventy-eight municipalities with
farmland-assessed acreage had voluntarily
adopted RTF laws and one other had a law but
did not report existence of farmland-assessed
7A segment of New Jerseyknown as the Pinelands
has a comprehensive growth management plan in
place. All Pinelands municipalities adopted the RTF
section of the Plan (N.J.A.C. 7:50-6.54, 1994). Such
an adoption may not trulyreflect the desire to preserve
agricultural activities. Also, the vagueness of the Pine-
Iands RTF provision and the fact thatthe provisions
are limitedto “municipal ordinancesandregulations
which inhibitefficientcrop production” suggestthat
theseordinancesarevery weak in the area of land-use
conflicts (N.J.A.C. 7:50-6.54, 1994). Pinelands munic-
ipalities were not included in this analysis unless they
have adopted an independent RTF ordinance.
acreage. There were 250 municipalities with-
out RTF legislation.
A scrutiny of the RTF laws reveals that
they employ five basic provisions to protect
agricultural practices: (1) exempt agriculture
from municipal ordinances and from regula-
tions which inhibit crop production, (2) allow
specific agricultural by-products and/or protect
specific agricultural practices, (3) require Gen-
erally Accepted Agricultural Management
Practices (GAAMP), (4) allow agriculture as
a permitted use in all zones, and (5) require
subdivisions to include notification to the buy-
ers of the property of the presence of an active
farms When the above classification system is
applied, a continuum of RTF provisions
emerges which progresses from the most gen-
eral (i.e., (1) above) to the most specific (i.e.,
(5) above). As the RTF provisions progress,
they provide agricultural operations with
stronger safeguards.y
The first three provisions may be regarded
as the weaker versions of the law since their
protections are vague (see Adelaja et al.,
1996). They do not provide absolute state-
ments that can provide greater protection in
land-use conflicts. The last two, allowing ag-
riculture as a permitted use and the notification
requirement, are considered strong versions of
8In some cases, the township’s RTF provisions are
included in the deed to the land. Notification is accom-
plished in one of two ways: The first is a notice that
indicates thatthe buyer is moving into an active farm
area. The second consists of a waiver whereby the
property owners cedes therightto object to local farm-
ing practices.
gFor example, provisions that require GAAMPs
provide a mechanism thatcan settleland-use conflicts.
When a RTF law establishes farming as a permitted
use throughout the municipality it provides greater
safeguards for farm operations. Judges pay special at-
tention to the “character of the locality” when deter-
mining appropriate land uses. Since appropriate land
uses can change over time, courts often defer to zoning
regulations (Hand, 1984). Therefore, an agricultural
operation that is a permitted land use stands a greater
chance of defeating a land-use lawsuit. The highest
level of protection is given by the notification require-
ment. This protection codifies the “coming to the nui-
sance” defense whereby new landowners must waive
objection to farming activities.574 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
the law since they do offer concrete statements
that support the agricultural industry. 1°
Data on the independent variables de-
scribed in Table 1 and equation (9) came from
a number of sources. The sources are de-
scribed in Table 1. Variables related to moti-
vation for RTF legislation include change in
farmland acreage (CHAGLAND), the per-
centage of land in farms (PERFARMS), and
the purchase of development rights (PDR)
program incentives (APACRES and CAD-
BREQ). 1I The PERFARMS variable permits
testing the ‘agricultural-interest/political clout’
arguments. APACRES is the acreage of farm-
land with development rights purchased or
pending final approval as of June 30, 1994.
CADBREQ is a binary choice variable for
Cape May, Middlesex and Morris Counties
whose County Agricultural Development
Boards all require municipalities to pass a
RTF law in order to participate in the PDR
program.
No concise catalog of environmentally sen-
sitive farmland exists. Hence, the percentage
of total farmland-assessed acreage comprised
of woodland and wetland (PERWOOD) serves
as a proxy. The percentage change in popu-
lation from 1980–90 (CHGPOP) was included
to investigate the validity of the growth con-
trol theory. Two characteristics of ‘high-sta-
tus’ communities—per-capita income (IN-
COME) and the percentage of owner-occupied
10 In nuisance lawsuits, courts often defer tOZOIling
regulations to determine appropriate land uses (Hand,
1984). Therefore, a RTF law that allows farming as a
permitted use throughout the township can provide
greater protection against nuisance lawsuits. With the
notification requirement, residential land users will
have a difficult time claiming that they didn’t know
they would be subjected to inconveniences created by
agricultural operations. Written notification of nearby
farming activities or RTF protections will be spelled
out in their title deed or in a separate document sup-
plied by the developer. Some notifications contain a
waiver whereby the buyer gives up the right to object
to local farming practices.
11 The absolute figure was used in pkice Of per-
centage since in a number of municipalities the fartn-
land-assessed acreage rose from zero to a positive
amount.
residences (OWNOCC)—are included. 12Ad-
ditionally, the percentage of white-collar
workers (WHTCOLAR) may offer a clearer
indication of the skills necessary to mobilize
a community into action against rapid growth.
White-collar workers are defined as those des-
ignated as ‘managers or professionals’ by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 13
Rapidly increasing real estate values can
indicate that local taxes are rising faster than
inflation, creating an incentive to retard de-
velopment. The change in average residential
value from 1984 to 1993 (CHGRSVAL) is
used to measure this effect. Population density
(DENSITY) is included as a variable to ac-
count for the pressure on the carrying capacity
of the municipality. The political factors that
influence policy outcomes are proxied by the
percentage of municipal governing body seats
held by the Democrats (MUNDEM). With
very few municipal Independents, the dummy
variable accounts for only two parties, thus
avoiding multicollinearity. The exclusion of
inter-party competition also reduces the inci-
dence of multicollinearity.
Spatial proximity is measured by whether
or not another municipality has passed a RTF
law within the same county (SPATIAL). The
dummy variable equals zero if the municipal-
ity is the first to adopt a RTF law within the
county. The dummy variable also equals zero
if no municipality has adopted a RTF law
within the county. If one or more municipali-
ties within the county have enacted a RTF law,
the dummy variable equals 1. The county level
was chosen for this variable because of the
close political relationship between the munic-
ipalities of a county and since municipalities
12 In a prelirnin~yinvestigation, it was found that
the percentage of college graduatesis highly correlated
with both income and the percentage of owner-occu-
pied residences. Because of this high degree of corre-
lation, the percentage of college graduates was left out
of the model.
IsOther categories may be considered white-collar
workers, but the one chosen includes those workers
with technicat expertise combined with experience
guiding and motivating a group on a regularbasis. The
growth control objective is rounded out with the per-
centage change in average residential value and the
population density.Adelaja and Friedman: Political Economy Right-to-Farm 575
Table 2. Results of the Disaggregated Weak and Strong Right-to-Farm Law Models
Marginal Effect on the Probability
Parameter Estimates Reported in Percentages
Independent All Weak Strong All Weak Strong













































































































































A single asterisk (*) indicates that parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
A double asterisk (**) indicates significant at the 0.05 level. Standard errors in parenthesis.
aMarginal effects calculated at the sample means (expressed in percentage terms).
bVariable definitions reported in Table 1.
consult with their County Agricultural Devel-
opment Boards when attempting to preserve
farmland in their districts. The logit procedure
in SAS was used to estimate the aggregate
RTF equation and two other equations for the
strong and weak laws.
Empirical Results
Aggregate Right-to-Farm Model
The dependent variable in the aggregate model
is the probability that a municipality would
have a RTF law. The McFadden’s R2 suggests
that the estimated model explains 45 percent
of the observed variation in the dependent var-
iable. At the 570 and 10% levels, four and six
variables, respectively, are significantly differ-
ent from zero (see Table 2). The results are
consistent with the agricultural objectives hy-
pothesis. Both the PERFARMS and the dum-
my variable for CADB requirement for county
PDR funds (CADBREQ) positively raise the
probability that a municipality would have a
RTF law.
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the political power or clout of the farm com-
munity is a major determinant of whether or
not a RTF legislation exists. In municipalities
where farmers control a larger portion of total
land, they can exert greater influence on local
political outcomes as opposed to farmers in a
suburban setting. With a greater voice in local
politics, farmers can propose legislation to
forestall the problems of farming in an urban-
izing area. On the other hand, as rural areas
become urbanized, non-farmers are more like-
ly to maintain the ability to regulate land-use
as their numbers, and presumably problems,
increase. The significant and highly positive
coefficient for (CADBREQ), the dummy var-
iable for the three County Agricultural Devel-
opment Board (CADBS) requiring that a mu-
nicipality must pass the legislation in order to
participate in the purchase of farmland devel-
opment rights (PDR), suggests that by tying
farmland preservation to RTF the non-farm
public can be forced to adopt a more favorable
agricultural climate.
The model failed to confirm the growth ob-
jective hypothesis of Gardner (1977). IN-
COME and DENSITY are inversely related to
the chances of the RTF law passing, and
CHAGLAND and CHGPOP are both statisti-
cally insignificant. That is, contrary to expec-
tations and to the hypothesis of Gardner, the
more affluent communities are least likely to
support agriculture, while communities where
open space is being lost the most or where
population growth and congestion are most
problematic are not necessarily more likely to
support agriculture. These same variables have
been shown to encourage farmland preserva-
tion. However, the fact that they do not en-
courage RTF suggests that the non-farm pub-
lic does not see RTF as farmland preservation.
This is intriguing, considering that the moti-
vation for many RTF laws in the first place is
agricultural preservation.
The model also failed to confirm the en-
vironmental objective hypothesis of Gardner.
An increase in the percentage of farmland
comprised of wetland and woodland (WET-
WOOD) will actually result in decreased odds
that a municipality will have an RTF law. The
SPATIAL variable was found to have an ad-
verse effect on the presence of the law. This
refutes the findings that laws pass from one
government to another in a contagious manner
and in fact suggests that when a neighboring
township passes a RTF law, others respond by
blocking such laws. The insignificance of
OWNOCC challenges the notion that a differ-
ence exists between owners and renters. The
fact that the coefficient of WHTCOLAR is in-
significant challenges the notion that the well-
educated white collar workers are more sup-
portive of agriculture. The insignificance of
CHGRSVAL suggests that individuals in the
more exclusive neighborhoods are less likely
to implement a RTF law. The insignificance of
the MUNDEM variable suggests that party
ideology does not affect the likelihood of pas-
sage and that RTF laws are not seen as liberal
or conservative.
The marginal effects on the probability of
a municipal RTF law are examined to provide
a clearer comparison of the independent vari-
ables. They are useful in understanding which
causal factors have the most effect. A one-per-
cent increase in the percentage of municipal
land dedicated to farmland (PERFARMS)
leads to a 0.37-percent increase in the proba-
bility that a municipal RTF law exists. Munic-
ipalities in counties with the CADB require-
ment for county PDR funds (CADBREQ)
have a 19.41-percentage increase in the prob-
ability of having the law in place. This sug-
gests how promising it is to utilize the “bitter-
pill” approach to RTF. For every dollar
increase in per-capita income (INCOME), the
probability of a RTF law decreases by 0.001
percent. As the population density (DENSI-
TY) climbs by one percent, the chances of
RTF legislation falls by 0.01 percent. With ev-
ery percentage rise in the amount of farmland
that is either wetlands or woodland (WET-
WOOD), the probability of municipal RTF
law decreases by 0.23 percent. Finally, when
another municipality within the county has
adopted a RTF law (SPATIAL), the probabil-
ity that other municipalities within the county
will adopt and maintain the law falls by 10.05
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Disaggregate Right-to-Farm Models: Weak
and Strong Laws
There are 31 municipalities with RTF laws
that provide only minimal protections for
farmers and 47 municipalities that provide the
highest degree of protection. Separate models
were estimated for each group. The model ex-
plains 43 percent of the observed variations in
the dependent variable for the weak municipal
RTF law and 44 percent of the observed var-
iations in the strong laws. At the 10-percent
level, four variables were significant in the
weak law function and six variables were sig-
nificant in the strong law function. Table 2
presents the estimated coefficients for both
types of laws and the marginal effect on the
probabilities of both.
As anticipated farmers’ political clout, as
measured by PERFARMS, raises the likeli-
hood of a strong law more than it raises the
chances of a weak version. This result can
viewed as a partial confirmation of the ‘agri-
cultural-interest’ model of farmland preserva-
tion policies. Farmer political clout translates
into policies that aim to protect agriculture. As
farmer political clout grows, it seems intuitive
that farmers push for stronger legislation.
The CADB requirement simply ties the
hands of the non-farm public. That is, if they
want farmland preservation, they must put in
place RT17The results suggest that the require-
ment is more likely to lead to a weak law than
a strong one. That is, in some cases, these
townships simply pass the weak version of the
law just to meet the requirement. The CADBS
do not require any specific language to be in-
cluded into the law. If the CADBS require that
a strong law is passed, either fewer townships
will want to participate in farmland preserva-
tion or the interest in strong laws will rise.
The presence of preserved acres in a town-
ship (APACRES) does not have any effect on
the probability of passing a strong or weak
law. This suggests that a critical mass of pre-
served acres is not what encourages RTF pro-
tection, but a critical mass of farmers. The idea
that preservation encourages a preservation
culture which translates into RTF protection is
therefore refuted. The insignificance of
CHGAGLND and the significant but negative
coefficient for DENSITY in both models again
refute the growth control theory. These sug-
gest that as residential land users come into
closer proximity of active farms, people are
less likely to allow the agricultural industry to
operate without their approval. However, the
fact that the marginal effect of DENSITY on
the probability of a weak law is more negative
than it is for a strong law suggests that the
more congested areas actually ‘relatively’ fa-
vor strong laws.
Rising income lowers the probability of a
strong law, but has no effect on the probability
of a weak law. If income is viewed as a proxy
for home values, then it seems that the greater
the investment, the more homeowners will op-
pose attempts to diminish their regulatory
powers.
Increases in the amount of environmentally
sensitive lands (WETWOOD) retard strong
laws, but have no effect on weak versions of
the laws. It therefore appears that as the per-
centage of farmland made up of environmen-
tally sensitive lands rises, public willingness
to grant farmers greater freedom to use their
land as they please diminishes because such
an action could endanger resources that the
non-farming public is trying to preserve. Con-
sequently, strong RTF laws would stand little
chance of passage if the true goal of RTF laws
were environmental preservation.
When another municipality within the
county has a strong RTF law (the SPATIAL
variable), the likelihood of a strong version of
the law diminishes. The same applies to weak
laws. However, the SPATIAL effect is more
debilitating to strong laws than it is to weak
laws. That is, municipalities view the strong
version of the law as a capitulation of property
rights, especially if the municipality has a lim-
ited agricultural industry.
Summary and Conclusion
This study is the first of its kind in many ways.
It is the first to econometrically investigate the
political economy of RTF laws. It is also the
first to investigate the validity of various the-
ories of the motivation for such protections.578 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1999
The study is also unique in that while previous
RTF studies have concentrated on statewide
legislation, the focus of this study is local. The
authors are not aware of any other studies that
have concentrated on local RTF laws. When
state level RTF laws are ineffective, the mu-
nicipal laws become more important. By
studying the mechanisms that facilitate the
passage of municipal RTF laws, this paper
makes an important contribution to the litera-
ture on the assignment of property rights and
agricultural protection. The study allows an
evaluation of the long-term viability of local
RTF laws as the clout of the farm community
dwindles.
A key finding here is that when one ob-
serves the existence of a RTF law, it is prob-
ably because the farm community still has
substantial control over municipal affairs or
because non-farmers are forced into compli-
ance through the carrot of farmland preser-
vation. Hence, given the continued decline in
farmers’ political clout at the urban fringe, to
the extent to which New Jersey’s experience
is applicable, one expects tougher days ahead
for municipal RTF laws. The findings that the
growth control and environmental rationale for
farmland preservation do not hold true for
RTF suggest that the non-farm public does not
see RTF as being in their best interest. There-
fore, the farm community may need to con-
centrate on educational programs that empha-
size the public benefits of RTF laws.
The finding that when the non-farm com-
munity is forced to support RTF in order to
get farmland preservation it opts for weak
RTF support suggests a resentment of RT.
laws. The fact that the spillover (SPATIAL)
effect is such that when a municipality passes
a law a neighboring town retaliates by block-
ing a RTF law also suggests such resentment.
It does appear that to preserve farming as well
as farmland, states may want to strengthen
state level RTF laws unless innovative ways
can be found to link local RTF laws to pres-
ervation or other goods the public demands.
This study seems to be consistent with the
Adelaja, et al. (1996) study in that it suggests
the importance of (1) educational programs
about the public benefits of RTF, (2) conflict
resolution and (3) conflict prevention.
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